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Abstract
Among the important factors in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was a large
ethical breakdown in the financial sector that preceded it. The sources of good ethical
behavior are multiple but religion ranks high among them. In thinking about the role of
religion, most people think first of Judaism, Christianity and other traditional religions. The
concept of religion should be extended, however, to include "secular religions" which were
among the most powerful religious influences of the twentieth century. This paper argues that
many people on Wall Street once believed in an American "civil religion" that was grounded
in a deep faith in the redeeming benefits of economic progress and political democracy.
Working on Wall Street thus was not simply a matter of making as much money as possible
individually, but was also seen as playing a key role in a national economic system that
served a transcendent purpose. Indeed, the efficient allocation of capital by the financial
system was especially critical to this core American religious project. By the twenty-first
century, however, the American civil religion was fading. This waning faith and the lack of
any new commonly accepted substitute contributed importantly to the large ethical failures of
Wall Street and other participants in the U.S. financial system during the 2000s.
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At both the popular and scholarly levels, the understanding of "religion" is being
extended today to encompass other belief systems besides Judaism, Christianity, and other
historic faiths of the world. A 2014 Poll by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, for
example, found that those who declared themselves to be "religiously unaffiliated" had grown
rapidly in the United States from 15 percent in 2007 to 23 percent in 2014.1 As the Pew
Forum noted, however, "we emphasize that the absence of a religious affiliation does not
necessarily indicate an absence of religious beliefs or practices. On the contrary ... most of
the 'nones' say they believe in God, and most describe themselves as religious, spiritual or
both." 2
Most current professionals on Wall Street would no doubt find such observations
puzzling in terms of opening an exploration of the causes of the financial crisis of 2008 and
2009. It is likely that few of them would regard the financial crisis as a religious crisis. But
that is precisely the argument I propose to make in this article.
In order to understand my argument, it is important to understand that in recent
years there has been a growing recognition that many of the belief systems conventionally
described as "secular" in the twentieth century actually had a powerful underlying religious
foundation. Indeed, they are best regarded as actual forms of religion, even if their adherents
do not believe in a traditional God. In his 2005 commencement speech to Kenyon College,
the great American novelist and essayist David Foster Wallace told the assembled students:
"Everybody worships. The only choice we get is what to worship."6 The potential objects of
religious worship can be economic outcomes such as material progress and the economic
systems that achieve such progress -- accompanied by the belief that economic progress will
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save the world in non-material as well as material respects. In 2016, the Harvard theologian
8
Harvey Cox would write of one form of such belief in "The Market as God."
Although he died in February 2013, the distinguished legal philosopher Ronald
Dworkin had completed by then Religion Without God.9 Recognizing that the "secular" is
often religion in a different form, Dworkin now considered that "expanding the territory of
religion improves clarity by making plain the importance of what is shared across that
territory" of religion in its full modem diversity of expression. As Dworkin writes, we can
thus speak, literally, not just metaphorically, of "religious atheism" as one form of actual
religious belief. Such secular forms of religion share with traditional religion the objective to
inquire "more fundamentally about the meaning of human life and what living well means."io
Well before Dworkin, a leading theologian of the twentieth century, Paul Tillich, said much
the same about developments in twentieth century religion, that they took a wide variety of
forms, sometimes not even explicitly recognized as religion, but nevertheless belonged in the
category of religion in that they dealt with matters of "ultimate concern."11
Many modern religions, moreover, implicitly substitute secular forces in this world
for the traditional role of God in Judaism and Christianity. The omnipotent role of the
"economic laws of history," for example, takes the place of God in Marxism. 12 The American
sociologist Robert Bellah famously wrote of the American "civil religion." George
Washington was its "Moses" and Abraham Lincoln was its "Christ" figure who gave his life
to save the Union.1 3 Such secular religions might even be described as new forms of Judaism
and Christianity in disguise - or for the more devout, they are new Jewish and Christian
heresies.14 No assessment of the religious history of the twentieth century will be complete
without an understanding of the rise of secular religion and its deep roots in traditional
religion."
Many people, moreover, have compartmentalized their religious beliefs. They look
to traditional religion at certain moments such as marriage and death. They look to secular
religions, however, to answer ethical and other issues that arise in public life. Indeed, in the
public arena the various denominations of "economic religion" -- the American civil religion
In the
being one of them -- were the most important religions of the twentieth century.
world of public policy, economic "efficiency" and "inefficiency" became the new operative
standard of "good" and "evil." Towards the end of the century, however, economic religion
See generally, Robert H. Nelson, Heaven On Earth: The Theological Meaning of Economics (Rowman
Littlefield Pub. 1991); Robert H. Nelson, Economics As Religion: From Samuelson To Chicago And Beyond
(Penn St. Univ. Press 2001).
Harvey Cox, The Market As God (Harvard University Press 2016).
Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press 2013).
'0 Id. at 5, 12, 9.
" D. MacKenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (Harper & Row 1965).
12 Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity (Shocken Books 1984); Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light:
Class, Conciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (2000).
" Robert H. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 Daedalus 19 (Winter 1967); See also David Gelernter,
Americanism: The Fourth Great Religion, at 92, 105 (Doubleday 2007).
4 Robert H. Nelson, The SecularizationMyth Revisited: Secularism as Christianityin Disguise, 18 J. Mrt. And
Morality 290 (Fall 2015).
1s Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion, at 1-3 (Princeton University Press 2006); Willis B. Glover, Biblical
Origins of Modem Secular Culture: An Essay in the Interpretation of Western History 3 (1984).
16 Robert H. Nelson, The Secular Religions ofEconomic Progress, 39 J. of Tech. & Soc. (Summer 2013).
&

7

48

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol17/iss1/5

4

Nelson: The Financial Crisis as a Religious Crisis
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AS A RELIGIOUS CRISIS

was increasingly challenged by "environmental religion," which substituted "natural" and
"unnatural" as a more valid understanding of "good" and "evil."
Religion and Wall Street
Although religion is not usually considered a main motivating factor in financial
system decision making, some observers have noted at least its implicit presence. The
Secretary of the Treasury during the first Obama administration, Timothy Geithner, wrote in
2014 that, looking back over his interactions over the years with the former Federal Reserve
Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan, he appeared to have been driven by an "almost quasitheological belief that markets were rational and efficient."0 8 The longtime economic
columnist for the Financial Times, Martin Wolf, wrote in 2014 of Greenspan that the
"rational pursuit of self-interest is the core ideology of the free market economy. But at the
height of the [financial] crisis [in October 2008], Greenspan stated [in testimony to the U.S.
Congress] the loss of his faith that self-interest would deliver financial stability. It was as if
the Pope declared that he no longer believed in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ." 19
More recently, the former head of the Bank of England during the events leading up
to and including the financial crisis, Mervyn King, described the modem banking system as a
contemporary form of "alchemy." o When he asked the former chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Bank, Paul Volker, for his single most important piece of advice, Volker replied that
it was to be sure to maintain a powerful sense of "mystique" around the workings of central
banking.2 1 Indeed, mystique is often essential to the success of a religion; when former
Washington Post editor William Greider wrote a 1989 book about the Federal Reserve Bank,
22
he described the Federal Reserve as "The Temple."
In the 1990s, as King considered, central banks took on a role as "financial idols"
within the world of the "cult of finance." King described the top private bankers as becoming
"the gods of finance." The success of the banking system depended on the moral standards,
levels of trust, and other features of "the culture of banking." Unfortunately, in the 1990s and
2000s, as King himself observed at close hand, this culture had been characterized by a
growing "delusion and greed."2 3 Wall Street behavior might not have been due to any fall in
a mythical ancient garden, but the results now often looked surprisingly similar to the old
biblical consequences of original sin.

17 Robert H.

Nelson, The New Holy Wars: Economic Religion Versus Environmental Religion in
Contemporary America (Penn State University Press 2010); John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of
Wilderness, 35 Envtl. L. 955 (2005); Thomas R. Dunlap, Faith in Nature: Environmentalism as a Religious
Quest (University of Washing Press 2004).
' Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises, at 85 (Crown Publishers 2014).
19 Martin Wolf The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned - and Have Still to Learn - From the
Financial Crises 195 (2014).
20 Mervyn King, The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global Economy (W.W. Norton
& Company 2016).
21 Id. 175.
22 William Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the
Country, at 48 (Simon and
Schuster 1989).
2 King, supra note 20, at 99, 117, 148, 289.
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Many people might think the frequent use King made of religious terms to describe
the 2000s world of finance -- a world that he knew as well as anyone -- was only
metaphorical, a way to enhance his message with the use of especially colorful adjectives.
Even when he is not using explicitly religious terms, however, the thrust of his 2016 book,
The End of Alchemy, is the large role in the U.S financial system of human ignorance and
irrationality, the widespread recent mass capitulation to private selfishness, the breakdown of
common moral standards, the loss of mutual trust, the pretense of certainty in face of the
unknown, the intellectual abdication of responsibility and other failures of economists and
other supposed "experts" on the financial system, and other growing dysfunctions in the
overall culture of the financial system since the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the financial
crisis and the Great Recession.
In the events leading up to the financial crisis, King found that there had been "an
erosion of ethical standards. ... Almost all the major banks have been dragged into one or
more misconduct scandals." 24 J. P. Morgan in the United States settled with the Justice
Department on a compensating payment of $13 billion for its misconduct contributing to the
financial crisis and the Bank of America agreed to a payment of $17 billion worldwide. King
reports that the total fines paid by banks since the banking crisis ended in 2009 had amounted
to the immense sum of $300 billion. Ultimately, a moral breakdown on this scale, as King
26
As
agrees, reflected a mass breakdown in the "culture" of American and world banking.
David Foster Wallace said about matters of individual religion, one can also say that every
culture is grounded in a religion, the only choice a society has is what religion it will be.
Religion thus has had a more powerful influence in American public life than most
27
economists and other social scientists of the twentieth century recognized. In one case, as
this paper will argue, the role of religion - broadly understood to include secular forms as
well as their predecessor traditional religions -- has had a large role in the workings of Wall
Street, and was a significant contributing factor to the events leading up to the financial crisis
of 2008 and 2009. The financial journalist Roger Lowenstein writes of the dot-com bubble in
the late 1990s, that "in the autumn of 1998, there ignited the bizarre frenzy for dot-com
stocks, a speculative mania so unhinged from ordinary logic it seemed the product of some
medieval sorcery - a cloistered theology rather than modern math." 28 If we understand
"theology" to encompass secular beliefs, the study of the workings of Wall Street becomes in
part the study of "religion" -- and as such thinking is formally developed the study of its
"economic theology."
I. TEN COMMON CAUSES GIVEN FOR THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
There are by now at least several shelves of books attempting to explain the causes
of the financial crisis. Rather than an overall problem of a cultural failure in the financial

24

Id at 99-100.

25

Id at 100.

26

Id at 98.

For more information regarding the financial crisis, see Ben S. Bemanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of
a Crisis and Its Aftermath (Norton, 1st ed. 2015); M. Paulson, Jr., On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the
Collapse of the Global Financial System (Business Plus, 1st ed. 2010).
28 Roger Lowenstein, The End of Wall Street, at 299 (Penguin Books 2011).
27
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system driven by religious developments, many explanations attempt to place the greatest
blame on one or another of the key actors in the American financial system - the government
regulators, the Wall Street firms, the Federal Reserve, the home mortgage originators, the
rating agencies, the U.S. Congress, the economics profession, the innovators of brand new
financial instruments (the "quants") and others.
Reviewing this literature, the most
commonly asserted leading causes include at least the following ten:
1. The shift of Wall Street ownership of the leading investment banks from the
1970s to the 1990s from a partnership form to public ownership by stockholders. This
significantly altered the incentives for top management in favor of taking greater risks that
might offer very large financial benefits to them in the short run, while they might have
minimal losses imposed on them in the event of failure in the longer run. As financial
journalists Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera write:
Goldman Sachs went public on May 4, 1999, ending a 130-year
partnership and ushering in a new era with shareholders to answer to, a
board of directors to provide oversight, and a chief executive officer. ...
The $3.6 billion the company raised in the offering made it the largest IPO
ever. ... Hank Paulson, who would become CEO within days of the IPO,
had a stake worth $289 million.
The IPO was a critical turning point for Goldman Sachs. Over time, the
culture did change, as the company became focused on such measures as
return on capital, stock performance and growth.
[Wall Street trading] can mean treating clients fairly or "ripping their faces
off," as traders sometimes put it. It can mean trading plain vanilla bonds
or peddling complex derivatives. Competitors [in the 2000s] began to
whisper that Goldman had become increasingly ruthless, increasingly
cutthroat, and increasingly concerned only about its own bottom line - and
its bonuses. "They'd cut your ear off for a nickel, rip your throat out for a
quarter, sell their grandmother for a penny, and sell two grandmothers for
29
two pennies," groused one private equity executive.
2. The introduction in the 1980s, and continuing into the 2000s, brought many new
financial instruments of rapidly growing technical complexity. This required the hiring of
new personnel with mathematical and other expert skills, but who were otherwise ignorant of
key aspects of capital markets, and the emergence of a new dangerous divide between these
experts and financial firm management that lacked the requisite technical skills to fully
understand the products that even their own banks were now selling. Wall Street Journal
reporter Scott Patterson explains that:
The Great Hedge Fund Bubble [of the mid 2000s] - for it was a true
bubble -- was one of the most frenzied gold rushes of all time. Thousands
Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden Story of the Financial Crisis, at 51153 (Portfolio 2010).

29
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of hedge fund jockeys became wealthy beyond their wildest dreams. One
of the quickest tickets to the party was a background in math and computer
science. In their quest for alpha, the quants had unwittingly primed the
bomb and lit the fuse for the financial catastrophe that began to explode in
spectacular fashion in August 2007.
The result was the biggest, fastest and strangest financial collapse ever
seen, and the starting point for the worst global economic crisis since the
Great Depression.Amazingly, not one of the quants, despite their charttopping IQs, their walls of degrees, their impressive Ph.D.'s, their billions
of wealth earned by anticipating every bob and weave the market threw
their way, their decades studying every statistical quirk of the market under
the sun, saw the train wreck coming.
3. The "dot-com" stock market bubble of the late 1990s, fueled by investor
enthusiasms and carelessness in light of 20 years of advancing stock prices, which created an
economic crisis when it collapsed in 2000, resulting in a desperate attempt of the Federal
Reserve in the early 2000s to avoid a deeper economic contraction by sharply lowering
interest rates, thus helping to stimulate a housing bubble that did in fact succeed for many
Americans in significantly compensating for their earlier asset losses in the stock market, and
postponing the reckoning. The economics staff writer for the New Yorker magazine John
Cassidy explains:
[A] displacement is what gets the speculative process [of a bubble] going.
... In the case of the housing and credit bubble, the displacement came in
the form of a drastic reduction in interest rates. From a peak of 6.5 percent
in 2000, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate - the rate at which
banks lend to one another - to 1.25 percent in November 2002.
By keeping the funds rate below 2.5 percent from November 2001 to
February 2005, the Fed ensured that most other [interest] rates fell to
record, or near-record, lows. The result, not surprisingly, was a borrowing
binge on the part of homeowners, consumers, businesses, and speculators.
Between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006, he total amount of debt
outstanding in the United States went from $31.84 trillion to $45.32
trillion, an increase of 42.3 percent.3 1
4. The mistaken confidence in the late 1990s of top government officials such as
Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and Larry Summers - then extending through most of
the Bush administration -- that the self-regulatory capacities of free markets carried over to
the special circumstances of a private financial system that often dealt in non-exclusive flows
of information as its unconventional main commodity, whose workings were too complex for
Scott Patterson, The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly
Destroyed It, at 12(Crown Business 2010).
31 John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities, at 221-223 (Farrar, Straus
and Giroux
2009).
30
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many outside - and quite a few inside as well -- observers to understand, and some of whose
key players were "too big to fail." As the Federal Judge (and prolific social commentator)
Richard Posner comments:
Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006,
was an economist held in high regard by the economics profession. In
concert with Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, successive Secretaries
of the Treasury between 1995 and 2001, Greenspan pushed through and
executed the policies that set the stage for the depression [of the financial
crisis and its aftermath]. The triumvirs refused to restrain lending, either
by raising interest rates or by tightening the regulation of bank's capital
structures; to bring the [complex] new financial instruments under
regulation; or to prick asset-price bubbles, as the Federal Reserve could
have done (and eventually did - too late) by raising interest rates further.
[Ben] Bernanke, a brilliant academic economist, succeeded Greenspan and
continued his policies. Both missed the warning signs, and Bernanke, who
became chairman of the Federal Reserve in 2006 ... was slow to accept
that there would be no soft landing and that the Federal Reserve would
have to trundle out its most powerful artillery to stop the slide. Had the
Federal Reserve acted sooner, the bubbles would have burst with less force
and the depression would probably have been averted. ... But I have to
acknowledge that there are political problems with pricking asset-price
bubbles and the Federal Reserve cannot maintain its political independence
if it ruffles too many feathers.32
5. The growing pressures exerted at the end of the Clinton administration and
subsequently by members of Congress such as Barney Frank and Chris Dodd to extend
home mortgage opportunities to poorer and riskier home buyers, leading to the creation of
large numbers of "sub-prime" mortgages, and eventually the collapse of the housing bubble.
Political scientists Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal write that:
The administrations of both Bill Clinton and George Bush both pushed the
idea of maximizing homeownership (although for different reasons). ...
One of the major pushes during the Clinton administration was to require
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increase the share of their loan portfolios
dedicated to mortgages for low and middle income families. In 2000,
Andrew Cuomo, then the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) secretary with oversight responsibilities for these government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), increased the required percentage of low
and middle-income mortgages from 42 to 50 percent of their portfolios.
Moreover, he dramatically increased requirements for the GSEs to buy
mortgages from underserved areas and those of "very-low income" [home
purchasers]. Partly as a result of such pressures, Fannie Mae's portfolio of

32

Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression, at 255-257

(Harvard University Press 2009).
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subprime loans grew to $15 billion in 2002 from a level of just $1.2 billion
in 2000. To diffuse any potential political backlash against GSE purchases
of risky loans, Cuomo's HUD also exempted the GSE's from additional
reporting requirements on their high risk loans. The GSEs also purchased
private-label subprime and close to subprime Alt-A residential mortgagebacked securities to the tune of $253 billion.3 3
6. Bowing in part to such pressures, the recklessness of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in shifting from their traditional acquisitions of higher quality mortgages to the
acquisition and packaging for resale of sub-prime mortgages, operating with implicit federal
guarantees, while enriching top managers such as James Johnson and his successor in 1999,
Franklin Raines, whose real expertise were not housing finance, but politics. The leading
New York Times business reporter Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner conclude that:
James Johnson's command-and-control management of the mortgage
finance giant [Fannie Mae] and his hardball tactics to ensure Fannie Mae's
dominance amid increasing calls for oversight are crucial to understanding
the origins of the worst financial debacle since the Great Depression.
Little known outside the Beltway, Johnson was the financial industry's
leader in buying off Congress, manipulating regulators, and neutralizing
critics. ... His strategy of promoting Fannie Mae and protecting its
lucrative government association, largely through intense lobbying,
immense campaign contributions, and other assistance given to members
of Congress, would be mimicked years later by companies such as
Countrywide Financial, an aggressive subprime mortgage lender, Goldman
Sachs, Citigroup and others.
Johnsons manipulation of the company's regulators provided a blueprint
for the financial industry, showing them how to control their controllers
and produce the outcome they desired: lax regulation and freedom from
any restraints that might hamper their risk taking and curb their personal
wealth creation.3 4
7. The failure in the mid-2000s of federal and state overseers of financial markets
such as the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission to exercise due
diligence in investigating the many large ongoing changes in housing finance, and to take
appropriate regulatory actions to respond to these developments. According to Sheila Bair,
who served on the governing board of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from 2006
to 2011:

Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Failure
of American Democracy, at 43-44 (Princeton University Press 2013).
34 Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed and
Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon, at 10 (Times Books et al., Ist ed. 2011).
33
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Looking back, one of the saddest things about the financial crisis is that it
could have been avoided so easily with a few commonsense measures [by
federal regulators]. If we had raised capital standards during the good
times, we would have averted many failures, particularly among the
investment banks. Instead, the leverage of the investment banks and
European institutions grew dramatically, and the FDIC had to fight a
lonely battle to prevent the same thing from happening with the banks we
insured. If the Fed had imposed lending standards for bank and nonbank
lenders, so much of the mortgage lunacy could have been averted. And if
Congress had not tied the hands of the CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading
Commission], SEC, and state insurance regulators to impose some basic,
commonsense regulatory controls on credit default swaps, the trillions of
dollars of trading losses would have been much reduced.
This is not to excuse the conduct of the industry and place all the blame on
the regulators. It was because of industry pressure that capital standards
were lowered, mortgage lending standards were blocked, and regulators
were barred from overseeing the derivatives market."
8. The similar failures in the mid-2000s of Standard and Poor's, Moody's and
Fitch, the three key rating agencies, to exercise due diligence in investigating such housing
market developments in light of the large number of new mortgage backed securities coming
to them for ratings, and to respond appropriately by introducing new rating methods for these
securities. The former Wall Street mergers and acquisitions banker and business writer,
William Cohan observes that:
By spring 2006, investors were probably not aware of the growing internal
doubts of analysts at S&P and Moody's about the mortgage backed
For instance, at a weeklong housing
securities they were rating.
conference, held on Amelia Island, Florida in 2005, two S&P credit
analysts noted that the housing market seemed to be getting a little frothy
and that the financial risks to the industry were ratcheting up, as housing
prices skyrocketed and lending standards deteriorated. "Despite these
risks," explained Ernestine Warner, a director in S&P's residential
mortgage-backed securities surveillance business, "there just isn't any
performance information on any of these products just yet because they are
still very new to the rharket. Due to the time lag associated with
delinquencies and losses in RMBS [residential mortgage backed securities]
pools, and the nature of the risks, it will be several years before the product
performance is tested."
[Despite this] S&P kept slapping investment-grade ratings on soon-to-beshaky new issues. ... [An observer at rival Moody's later commented that]

3 Sheila Bair, Bull By the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street, and Wall Street From Itself,

at 356 (Simon & Schuster 2012).
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"What happened in 2004 and 2005 with respect to subordinated tranches is
our competition, Fitch and S&P, went nuts. Everything was investment
grade. It didn't really matter [what the mortgage-backed security was

like]."

36

9. The unwillingness or inability in the mid 2000s of Goldman Sachs, Citicorp,
Morgan Stanley, J. P. Morgan and other Wall Street commercial and investment banks
to address obvious signals of growing distress in housing markets and housing finance, and
equally important to take actions to protect their customers, especially those investing in
mortgage-backed securities, and to use their large political influence to seek a stronger
governmental response in Washington. New York Times financial columnist Andrew Sorkin
explains:
Financial titans believed they were creating more than mere profits. They
were confident [in the 2000s] that they had invented a new financial model
that could be successfully exported around the globe. "The whole world is
moving to the American model of free enterprise and capital markets,"
Sandy Weill, the architect of Citigroup, said in the summer of 2007.
But while they were busy evangelizing their financial values and
producing these dizzying sums, the big brokerage firms had been
bolstering their bets with enormous quantities of debt. Wall Street firms
had debt to capital ratios of 32 to 1. When it worked, this strategy worked
spectacularly well, validating the industry's complex models and
When it failed, however, the result was
generating record earnings.
catastrophe.
The crowning example of liquidity run amok was the subprime mortgage
market. At the height of the housing bubble, banks were eager to make
home loans to nearly anyone capable of signing on the dotted line. With
no documentation a prospective buyer could claim a six-figure salary and
walk out of a bank with a $500,000 mortgage, topping it off a month later
with a home equity line of credit. Naturally, home prices skyrocketed, and
in the hottest real estate markets ordinary people turned into speculators,
flipping homes and tapping home equity lines to buy SUVs and power
boats.

-

At the time, Wall Street believed fervently that its new financial products
mortgages that had been sliced and diced, or "securitized" [into a multitude
of "tranches"] had diluted, if not removed, the risk.

William D. Cohan, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World, at 485-486 (First
Anchor Books Edition 2011).
3 Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial
System - and Themselves, at 4-5 (Penguin Group 2009).
3
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10. The intellectual failures of the economics profession and business school
students of the financial system, self absorbed in their own internal professional discussions,
seldom taking the trouble to learn enough about the real world, more concerned to seek the
social prestige of physics through the use of mathematical methods, culminating in economics
in a prominent new professional literature emerging not long before 2008 explaining why in
recent decades a lasting "Great Moderation" had replaced the previous cyclical instability of
the U.S. economy, attributing this to the large advances of economic science and the wisdom
of professional economic policy advice. University of Middlebury economics professor
David Collander (and his co-authors) write that in retrospect:
The global financial crisis has revealed the need to rethink fundamentally
how financial systems are regulated. It has also made clear a systemic
failure of the economics profession. Over the past three decades, most
economists have developed and come to rely on models that disregard key
factors-including the heterogeneity of decision rules, revisions of
forecasting strategies, and changes in the social context-that drive
outcomes in asset and other markets. It is obvious, even to the casual
observer, that these models fail to account for the actual evolution of the
real-world economy. Moreover, the current academic agenda has largely
crowded out research on the inherent causes of financial crises. There has
also been little exploration of early indicators of systemic crisis and
potential ways to prevent this malady from developing. In fact, if one
browses through the [past] academic macroeconomics and finance
literature, "systemic crisis" seems to be an otherworldly event, absent from
economic models. Most models, by design, offer[ed] no immediate handle
on how to think about or deal with this recurring phenomenon. In our hour
of greatest need, societies around the world are left [today] to grope in the
dark without a theory. That, to us, is a systemic failure of the economics
38
profession.
A Free-RiderProblem
In considering these ten important causes commonly given for the financial crisis,
one might suggest that the burden of responsibility falls on "no one" because it actually falls
on "everyone." Even if they might have individually recognized the various developing
problems of the public and private institutions of the financial system, effective action would
have required collective action. With other institutions failing to provide leadership,
individual institutions in each area of the financial system continued to act from the point of
view of maximizing their own institutional interests (following the seeming mantra of free
market religion). As one might say, the healthy functioning of the overall financial system is
a collective goal, not only for participants in that system, but of national significance, yet all
the key participants in the system in the 1990s and 2000s increasingly behaved like free-

David Colander, et. al, The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession, 21
Critical Review 249-250 (July 2009).
3
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riders. 9 In its own way, the financial system now offered another example of "the tragedy of
the commons."
As Elinor Ostrom and others have explained, in the face of a free-rider problem, and
without government controls or a formal system of private property rights, effective collective
action to manage a commons requires the presence of some strong communal beliefs (the
financial system can be seen as a particular form of community).40 If such shared beliefs
might once had been adequately present in the American financial system (if subject to
periodic lapses), they have been eroding with growing speed since the 1980s. To the extent
that unifying beliefs are ultimately a matter of a common culture and religion, as broadly
understood here, the financial system was facing a spreading religious crisis.
The financial system was admittedly not alone. Indeed, the financial crisis can be
seen as a particularly unfortunate symptom of a more systemic set of problems in American
public life. These relate to matters such as the steadily growing role of the federal
government over the course of the twentieth century that eventually exceeded its
administrative capacities, partly owed to the frailties of a political system created more than
200 years ago with a design to distribute the exercise of power widely. The American
intellectual class has been shaped by American universities reorganized 100 years ago in the
progressive era to provide professional skills for the "scientific management" of American
society, even as it has become increasingly evident that the capabilities of expert knowledge
to comprehensively understand and "manage" society were much overrated then and now.4 1
Another factor is that an American leadership class forged in the fire of World War
II and the Cold War had passed from the scene, leaving a conspicuous absence of similar
leadership capabilities among the professional and other elites that today play a central role in
the American system. In one especially important case, American newspapers, television,
and other leading media in the 1970s and 1980s shifted from providing valuable information
to providing entertainment, abdicating their former significant public leadership role. The
American "civil religion" - in which faith in economic progress had a central place -- that
once had had such a large part in forming the common values of the American "melting pot,"
binding the nation together culturally and religiously, has been replaced by a greater pluralism
of fundamental beliefs that makes agreement and action more difficult for a nation state as
large and diverse as the United States.
The progressive economic religion that played such a large role in American history
over the course of the twentieth century looked to the national government to orchestrate the
American pursuit of economic progress. By the 1970s, however, there was increasing
evidence of the decline of federal government capacities -- and by the 2010s this had become
a virtually bipartisan agreement on the "dysfunctional" character of the federal system in
Washington. One reaction was the spread of a powerful libertarian and individualistic
element in U.S. political thought -- seeking to shift responsibilities from American state
institutions to the private market. In providing new theoretical foundations for such
See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Harvard University Press 1971).
40 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge
University Press 1990).
41 Robert H. Nelson, Government as Theatre: Towards a New Paradigmfor the Public Lands, 65 Univ, of
Colorado L. Rev. 2 (1994); Robert H. Nelson, Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure of Scientific
Management (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1995).
3
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developments, the University of Chicago dominated the awarding of Nobel prizes in
economics -- in the period from 1975 to 2000 at least 17 of the Nobel prize winners in
economics were faculty members or were otherwise closely associated with the University of
Chicago.4 2 A critic of this, the celebrated author of a three volume biography of John
Maynard Keyes, Robert Skidelsky, would write in the wake of the financial crisis that such
Chicago thinking had "brainwashed" -- as one might say, cast a type of religious spell over -much of the economics profession.43
The Chicago critique of the failings of progressive economic religion in the United
States made a valuable contribution to American public discussion of the limitations of the
U.S welfare and regulatory state. It was correspondingly lacking, however, in any clear
understanding of the ethical and cultural -- the religious -- ingredients necessary to effective
collective action at the level of the American nation state (or even at the level of the financial
system)." Chicago libertarian individualism nevertheless from the 1980s increasingly
became a popular religion of Wall Street -- Alan Greenspan early in his life had been an
acolyte of Ayn Rand who preached a form of libertarianism (if not the Chicago form of, say,. a
Milton Friedman).
Wall Street over the past 30 years has been among the leading arenas in which such
systemic developments in American life have played out, culminating in one especially
important instance in the financial crisis and the "great recession" that began in 2008 and
continued through 2009. Some individuals did attempt to stand up to such developments. As
a leading chronicler of these developments, however, Lowenstein explains that there was
nevertheless a collective moral breakdown by traditional American ethical standards -- to go
along with a technical failure of financial insight on Wall Street: "Bankers who took home
these enormous paychecks were crafty financiers, but their cleverness served their personal
interests first, their clients and shareholders second, and the economy barely at all. The
bankers learned to fool the system: to game the rating agencies, to bundle deadbeat mortgages
into paper that was triple A and foist it on trusting clients. They fooled their compensation
committees and they fooled society, collecting astronomical pay for products (such as
synthetic CDOs) that made only bankers richer."45
A central part of the story of the financial crisis has been the worsening fate of
"economic religion," the declining conviction that American economic growth and
development, eventually abolishing all poverty in the United States, will resolve the historic
problems of the human condition; that America is still chosen to be a "city on a hill" for the
world. Although this idea is as old as the original Puritan settlers in Massachusetts, it was
carried into the twentieth century as the secular national belief in America as the world
exemplar of modern economic progress with its transcendent consequences for humanity. For
a variety of reasons, this core element of American civic religion since the 1960s has faced
growing challenges; accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s, a cultural development that could
have a surprisingly large impact even on the American financial system. Mutual trust is
important in all areas of economic life, but especially so on Wall Street, thus bringing the

42
43
"

45

Nelson, supra note

7, at 117.
Robert Skidelsky, Keynes, The Return of the Master, at xii (Public Affairs 2009).
Nelson, Economics as Religion, see Part III, "The Gods of Chicago." (Penn St. Univ. Press 2001).
Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 75.
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existence of a common set of unifying beliefs prominently into the picture as a key historical
basis for the mutual trust necessary to sustain the financial system.
II. WALL STREET AND "RELIGIOUS CAPITAL"'
The first common explanation offered above for the financial crisis - and a key
starting point for the others to follow -- relates to the changing ownership structure of Wall
Street investment banks. Most investment banks, such as Lehman Brothers and Goldman
Sachs, were traditionally partnerships until the 1980s and 1990s. For various reasons,
including the need for greater working capital, they then became public corporations with
stock holders and a board of directors to oversee the firm. Goldman Sachs in 1999 was the
last of such moves to public ownership, now including all the key investment banks (the
commercial banks such as J. P. Morgan and Citibank had long been public corporations). As
a result, the top management was no longer personally responsible as partners for the
financial obligations of the investment bank, becoming employees instead. They were
compensated through high salaries and contingent payments, such as stock options. The shift
to corporate ownership put additional pressure on the cultural and religious resources that
would be required to combat the free-rider problem of the Wall Street commons, and thus, to
sustain a healthy financial community for the good of the whole financial system.
While previously operating as partnerships, the top leadership of investment banks
traditionally knew each other well. They often came from similar social and religious
backgrounds, frequently served for long periods of time together, and had established
common bonds that facilitated both trust and the full sharing of vital information. With the
shift to public ownership, however, there were serious new "agency problems" in that, with
the large numbers of stockholders, most of them did not have the information to evaluate
management performance accurately. This was a particular problem in that the potential
financial losses from taking large risks that might fail would now fall most heavily on the
stockholders themselves, rather than on a set of partners who owned the firm and were
personally responsible for fulfilling its financial commitments, making decisions in that light
(some the corporate officers did in fact incur large losses but far less cumulatively than a set
of private partners would have).
The economic columnist for the Financial Times, Martin Wolf, thus observes that in
the circumstances of the financial sector, corporate "insiders can easily exploit in their own
interest" the decisions made by their firms. When cultural restraints on self-serving
management behavior break down, as they did on Wall Street, large public financial
"corporations are ... vulnerable to looting by management."" Top management in the
financial sector had incentives to emphasize short term results that drove up stock prices (and
their total compensation). If they entered into more risky activities that might offer especially
high short term payouts, there would be only a small chance of a dire outcome during such a
short period. If they happened to be unlucky and to experience large short run business
failures, they were most likely to be fired or resign but without having to absorb themselves
any of the firm's financial losses.
As Wolf finds, for it to work properly, "a complex
financial system" on which the whole national economic system is so dependent is necessarily

Martin Wolf Reforming Western Capitalism, in Janet Byrne, ed., The Occupy Handbook, at 344 (Back Bay
Books 2012).
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based on a "fragile network of trust" among the participants. 47 The determinants of trust and
mutual responsibility thus for Wolf become fundamental factors influencing the basic
functioning of financial markets.48
Ideally, the various key private and public players in the world of housing finance
would have felt a sense of shared responsibility for their actions to the wider society.
Working to maximize individual self interest might work well in many areas of American
economic life, but the large institutions of Wall Street thus are not one of them. Indeed, it
was essential throughout Wall Street that there be a sense of internal personal obligation to
uphold professional standards and to serve the needs of customers. If that had been the case,
many Wall Street professionals would have been motivated to give closer scrutiny to the full
technical workings of the rapidly evolving financial system. Some of them would have
shown the courage to warn the wider world of the looming large financial dangers for the
whole system that might easily be triggered by unforeseen events. They would have publicly
demanded accountability and corrective actions, occurring at the mortgage origination level,
within their own Wall Street firms, in the rating agencies, in the federal regulatory agencies,
and among those academics who had professional responsibilities for doing research on
financial markets.
It might be suggested that the severe shortage of any such Wall Street saints
reflected a collective failure of insight, not a failure of Wall Street ethics; but insight comes to
those who already have a deep personal commitment to finding answers for the collective
good. It would have required strong independence of mind and considerable personal
courage to speak out loudly and publicly against the evolving culture of Wall Street in the
1980s and 1990s, culminating in the 2000s. There were a few people who did in fact try, but
they were too small in number and influence. Most of the individual members of the financial
system remained focused on their own actions and the rewards (money, prestige, power, etc.)
that accrued to them individually and to their firms. Then a high level federal financial
regulator, Sheila Bair, writes of attending a 2007 Wall Street conference and being told that
the members of the finance industry "have a right to make fat profits by any means." 49 If
challenged, they could, moreover, justify such behavior as simply the pursuit of individual
self-interest -- as they might assert, the longstanding foundational ethic of the American free
market economic system.
Wall Street, however, is far from a free market. In his memoirs, the economist
Henry Kaufman - for many years the director of research for Salomon Brothers and a
prominent Wall Street presence in the 1970s and 1980s -- explains that market discipline does
not work in circumstances such as those found on Wall Street, where the leading firms are
"too big to fail." Moreover, they deal significantly in information -- such as the predicted
profitability of individual firms and the market prospects for individual stocks - as a main
product of Wall Street, even as private property rights to these and other easily communicable
forms of information are especially difficult to establish and defend, giving much of Wall
Street's knowledge "output" the character of a public good. As Kaufman observes, the
largest Wall Street corporations are therefore "less like ordinary business enterprises and
more like public utilities." In other nations, organizations, having such critical social

" Id. at 341.
4
See generally Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1996).
49 Bair, supra note 35, at 356.
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responsibilities, have frequently been nationalized outright, for better or for worse. In the
United States, a directly government-run financial sector would almost certainly be for the
worse, given the nation's fractured politics and the difficulties of achieving decisive public
actions in the U.S. political system (imagine the federal government having to hire the
personnel to operate such nationally essential organizations as are found on Wall Street under
standard civil service rules and procedures and with tight salary limitations).
As a result, even as they are nominally "private," the larger Wall Street firms, as
Kaufman writes, actually possess distinctively "public" responsibilities for the allocation of
capital in the United States, a matter fundamental to the workings of the entire American
economic system. As he explains, given their "awesome role and responsibilities in the larger
society," and the difficulty of imposing outside public control over their internal activities,
and if they are to maintain their social legitimacy with the wider American public, the
"leading financial institutions must adhere to an unusually high code of business conduct.
They must take into account not only their narrow private interests, but also their considerable
public responsibilities."so All this requires internal restraints grounded in a belief system - a
body of "religious capital," as one might say - to prevent individual firms and managers from
following their own narrowest personal incentives. The former chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Paul Volker, wrote in 2000, similarly, that in financial markets there is a necessary
balance for private actors "between the need to compete, to prosper, to grow, and the need to
treat clients fairly, to maintain high fiduciary standards, and to respect the broad public
interest reflected in regulation and supervision." 51 Wall Street from the 1980s onwards,
however, increasingly lacked a powerful set of ethical and other cultural forces to sustain a
strong sense of greater public responsibility, a matter that would eventually prove to be of
critical national significance.
From the 1980s onwards, Wall Street leadership thus increasingly failed to accept
or perhaps even to recognize - the existence of such wider public responsibilities.52 At a
deeper level, therefore, an explanation for the financial crisis must seek answers as to the
fundamental causes of this growing neglect of collective social responsibilities . This is
difficult territory for most social scientists because they are accustomed to regarding "values"
as given prior to and outside their analysis. Their methods are poorly suited to investigating
the determinants of the values themselves, or when, why and how they change. When they do
address such subjects, they tend to assume that any new values are determined by other more
"real" factors such as the economic events themselves. The concept that ideas and values
have an internal logic of their own, capable of shifting significantly over time, which can
themselves significantly drive economic events, rather than the other way around, is foreign
to most social scientists even today (it disappeared almost entirely among them in the
twentieth century). It might take social scientists, as this article will suggest, into matters of
religion - in its formal articulation into matters of theology in all its contemporary diversity.
But then there is a large problem: most social scientists not only would reject any such efforts
Henry Kaufman, On Money and Markets, at 228 (McGraw Hill, 1st ed. 2010).
5 Paul Volker, Foreword to Henry Kaufman, On Money and Markets: A Wall Street Memoir, at vi (McGraw
Hill 2000).
52 Tracie R. Potter, Pawns for a Higher Greed: The Banking and FinancialServices Industry's Capture of
FederalHomeownership Policy and the Impact on Citizen Homeowners, 37 Hamline L. Rev. 139 (2013/2014);
Matt Stoller, The Housing Crash and the End of American Citizenship, 39 Fordham Urban L. J. 1183 (May
2012).
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(as I would say, as a matter of their own religious principals), but have had little or no training
or experience doing theological analyses.
A Case Illustration:Moody's
There were many parties who contributed to the events leading up to the financial
crisis. But three private firms bore a particularly large burden of responsibility for the Great
Recession and all that followed. They are Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch, the three
main credit rating agencies. In the way they reached their internal decisions concerning
appropriate ratings, each held a key public responsibility to defend the ethics and cultural
integrity of Wall Street. They failed abysmally.
At the height of the Wall Street follies, the rating agencies gave high ratings
(including the highest AAA rating stating that there would be very low, or even almost a nonexistent risk) to many mortgage-backed securities.
These ratings proved to be
fundamentally inaccurate even for the highest rated securities, as unfortunate investors in
them would subsequently discover. Seldom have the sins of so few in American business had
such large adverse consequences for so many investors and indeed the whole nation. Rather
than J. P. Morgan, Bank of America and other Wall Street institutions, the Justice Department
might more legitimately have focused its legal energies after the financial crisis on
prosecuting the rating agencies - but then of course they do not have nearly as much money
to pay out, and make a politically less attractive target.
One of the better books chronicling the events of the financial crisis is by Bethany
McLean (who had personal experience working on Wall Street and was a business writer for
13 years for Fortune magazine) and Joe Nocera (a business writer and editor at the New York
Times). In All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of the FinancialCrisis, they include a
chapter on how Moody's was transformed from a notably responsible business organization
as late as the mid 1990s to an illustration of all that went wrong on Wall Street in the next
decade.5 4 A key event, as suggested above, was that Moody's became a public corporation
for the first time in 2000. At around the same time - and partly related -- there was an
important change, for the worse, in the culture of the firm.
As McClean and Nocera explain, the historic culture of Moody's involved taking
the firm's economically critical role in the credit markets seriously as a matter of the
fulfillment of a basic professional duty. In the 1970s, Moody's and other rating agencies first
began charging the issuers of securities for doing the ratings, thus tying their own business
fate to the satisfying of their new paymasters. It was an obvious conflict of interest but
nothing was done to reform the situation as the adverse consequences took time to
materialize. As McClean and Nocera write:
In retrospect, the surprise is not that the rating agencies would eventually
be corrupted by their business model, but that it took so long to happen.
For many years, whatever mistakes they made were the result of misguided

53 Nicholas D. Homer, If You Rate It, He Will Come: Why Uncle Sam's Recent Intervention with the Credit
RatingAgencies was Inevitable and Suggestionsfor Future Reform, 41 Florida State Univ. L. Rev. 489 (Winter
2014).
54 Nocera, supra note 29.
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analysis, not out-and-out cravenness. This was especially true of Moody's,
which had a reputation among bond issuers as a "hard ass." ... The
Moody's culture, introverted and nerdy, was more akin to academia than
Wall Street. Analysts would answer their phones after many rings, if at all.
Moody's analysts were standoffish toward the issuers who paid their
salaries - a little like journalists during the heyday of newspapers, when
they could thumb their nose at advertisers. Credit analysts at Moody's
didn't worry about the revenue that might be lost if they refused to give an
issuer [of a seourity] the rating it sought. That was someone else's
problem. In the early 1990s, Moody's actually refused to rate a then
popular structured product, on the grounds that a [favorable] rating might
lead investors to expect more than they were likely to get.
This last anecdote was recounted in a 1994 article in Treasury and Risk
Management magazine entitled, "Why Everyone Hates Moody's." After
polling ninety-nine corporate treasurers, the magazine concluded that
"ingrained in Moody's corporate culture is a conviction that too close a
relationship with [Wall Street security] issuers is damaging to the rating
process [and thus unacceptable for a person working for Moody's].55
McLean and Nocera relate that one important Moody's employee, Mark Adelson,
was a "careful, cautious, somewhat skeptical analyst" in the 1990s. Adelson recognized
many of the problems that would lead eventually to the financial crisis. As they put it, "he
was always less willing to accept uncritically many of the arguments made for [the] mortgage
backed securities" that would later fail on such a large scale. Rather, he argued within
Moody's that "the fact that an asset class like housing had performed well in the past said
nothing about how the same asset class was going to perform in the future." By 2000,
however, Adelson was out of step; he quit in 2001.
A good indicator of future cultural developments at Moody's happened in 2001,
when the public corporation Enron went bankrupt, wiping out its stockholders. Moody's and
the other credit rating agencies had failed altogether to anticipate Enron's downfall,
McClean and
maintaining the rating of Enron's debt until four days before it collapsed.
Nocera report that at a Congressional hearing "the S&P analyst who had covered Enron
confessed that he hadn't even read some of the company's financial filings." But in the end
"not a single analyst at either Moody's or S&P lost his job as a result of missing the Enron
fraud.... 'Enron taught them how small the consequences [on Wall Street] of a bad reputation
6
[now] were,"' said a former analyst.
Economists are skeptical of economic interpretations that depend on the behavior of
a particular individual. Hoping to emulate the physical sciences, they seek to discover
general scientific "laws" of the workings of economic systems. In the case of Moody's, the
leading agent of change, however, was a single identifiable person, a new hire to the firm in
1991 with a law degree, but little financial knowledge or experience, Brian Clarkson. By
2000, Clarkson had ascended to top management levels, including direct responsibilities for

* Id. at 114.
6 Id. at 119,120.
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the ratings being developed by the asset-backed finance division. McLean and Nocera report
that:

-

Clarkson went off like a bomb inside Moody's. He developed a reputation
for being nasty to those who wouldn't fight back and for never forgetting a
slight. "At my level, any water cooler discussion of his management style
included the words "fear and intimidation." ... [He rose at Moody's partly
because] the company's top executives "recognized in Brian the character
of someone who could do uncomfortable things with ease, and they
exploited his character to advance their [new] agenda. That agenda was
using structured finance to boost revenues, market share, and - above all
Moody's stock price [and thus management compensation under the new
corporate status adopted in 2000]."
In issuing high ratings in the 2000s for many mortgage backed securities, at
Moody's "nowhere in the process was anyone required to conduct real-world due diligence
about the underlying mortgages" and the actual risks that some of them might default. Given
the absence of such detailed investigations, the ratings had to be developed based on "a series
of assumptions," including that any declines in housing prices "would not be severe" and that
declines in one housing market would occur independent of declines in other housing markets
in other regions (thus allowing the pooling of mortgages from many regions to reduce overall
risk through diversification). The three ratings agencies competed to issue favorable ratings
and the investment banking community used its leverage to increase the pressure. McClean
and Nocera report of one Moody's analyst who sought to give more skeptical ratings that
"Goldman Sachs once requested that he not be assigned to its deals."58
One Wall Street observer in retrospect would characterize much of what went on at
the ratings agencies and throughout Wall Street in the 2000s as a version, as McLean and
Nocera write, of a "Ponzi scheme." Buffalo Law School Professor David Westbrook
comments similarly that "investment bubbles have the structure of Ponzi schemes" - a point
made much earlier by the economist Hyman Minsky.59 In the case of the rating agencies,
their ability to generate continually rising profits and rapidly climbing stock prices depended
on a steadily increasing flow of favorable ratings for which they would be generously
compensated.
While he does not use this label, Federal Judge Richard Posner writes of the
financial crisis, that it further revealed "the tendency of corporate management to cling to a
bubble and hope for the best." 60 Current debt and payment obligations will be met by
incurring new obligations. Indeed, as long as confidence holds, this method will work. As
asset backed securities became more popular, their total sales on Wall Street soared from $69
billion in 2000, to around $500 billion in 2006, so there was always plenty of new money
coming in. McClean and Nocera observe that "the rating agencies were at the very heart of
the madness. The entire edifice would have collapsed without their participation." They

" Id. at 115.
* Id. at 116, 118.
5 David A. Westbrook, Out of Crisis: Rethinking Our Financial Markets, at 26 (Paradigm Pub. 2010).
6 Posner, supra note 32, at 93.
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conclude their examination of Moody's by acidly commenting that "in August 2007, Brian
Clarkson was named president of Moody's. His compensation that year was $3.2 million."61
Bernard Madoff was discovered a little more than a year after that and went to jail
for life for running his own individual Ponzi scheme on Wall Street. But as St. Augustine
once famously said, when piracy occurs on a large enough scale, we call it the government (or
in this case "Wall Street" with the government acting in a supporting role). It would make an
interesting discussion for a college ethics class whether Brian Clarkson, and others of his
Wall Street ilk, should have borne more severe individual penalties than they did.
An Anthropology of Wall Street -- Gobbledygook, Silos, and Social Silences
Some of the best accounts of the developments leading up to and causing the
financial crisis have been by financial journalists. One such book by the highly acclaimed
financial journalist Gillian Tett is Fools Gold: The Inside Story of J P. Morgan and How
Wall Street Greed Corrupted Its Bold Dream and Created a Financial Catastrophe. She
writes there of how in in the panic of 2008 "what was driving the price of super-senior risk
[such as the highest rated, supposedly risk free "tranches" of mortgage backed securities] was
not so much 'hard' economic data, which could be plugged into models, but investor fear,
which economists had long ignored in their modeling." In this new circumstance, the
"quants" -- quantitative analysts on Wall Street - who had assumed a newly rational world
now "were at sea. It was a terrifying, disorienting landscape, and the banking community was
about to suffer a gut-wrenching case of vertigo." 62 Tetts covered these events, and then
wrote insightfully about them for the London-based FinancialTimes (in 2009, she received
an award as British Business Journalist of the Year for her coverage of the financial crisis).
As it happens, she had earlier been professionally trained as an anthropologist and applied
that lens as well to the events she was observing.
Three years after Fool's Gold appeared, Tett in 2012 summarized her overall
63
At the core, she found three basic "problems
thoughts on the causes of the financial crisis.
in modem finance: the cultural dangers of goobledygook, silos, and social silences." As she
writes, there is little evidence of "any coordinated, deliberate plot by bankers to conceal their
activities or downplay the risks before 2007. Instead, many of the [most damaging] activities
were hidden in plain sight." It was admittedly true that many Wall Streeters "preferred to
keep their deals away from the limelight - and the noses of regulators - because that allowed
them to boost their [profit] margins (and stop rivals from stealing their ideas)." But the
necessary information to understand the situation was obtainable, if admittedly in obscure
64
places such as "rating agency reports, bank filings and other data."
Indeed, Tett writes, it would have been "possible for outsiders to spot that the
system was spinning out of control and [had] become prone to excess." Doing this, however,
would not be easy; it would require diligent - perhaps heroic -- efforts by a person to

Nocera, supra note 29.
Gillain Tett, Fool's Gold: The Inside Story of J. P. Morgan and How Wall Street Greed Corrupted its Bold
Dream and Created a Financial Disaster, at 46 (2009).
63 Gillian Tett, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Problem of Silos and Silences in Finance,
in Janet Byrne, ed., The
61

62

Occupy Handbook (2012).
64

Id. at 45, 46.
66

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol17/iss1/5

22

Nelson: The Financial Crisis as a Religious Crisis
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AS A RELIGIOUS CRISIS

-

"confront the goobledygook" that was being generated on such a large scale. The obscurity
of expression conceivably could have been intentional, while not doing anything illegal,
designed to hide abuses, while still complying with the legal disclosure formalities, or to limit
the availability of valuable information to select professional audiences. It was also a product
of the tendencies to speak in insider jargon that characterize the very nature of America's
professional cultures such as law and economics.
For Tett, an urgent question today is why did "so few people actually ask hard
questions at all," including almost all the media. Owing to the lack of deeper scrutiny (why
were there so few whistleblowers on Wall Street), the result was that "Western Society
allow[ed] finance to spin out of control" -- with disastrous worldwide consequences. As
another important factor, Tett finds that the large organizations involved with matters on Wall
Street had strong tendencies towards the compartmentalization of knowledge - to break into
distinct "silos" that did not communicate with one another. As she writes, "inside the giant
bureaucracies of the modern banks, it seemed that different departments existed almost like
warring tribes: although the separate desks, or divisions, of banks were theoretically supposed
to collaborate, in practice they competed furiously for scarce resources, knowing that
whatever desk earned the greatest profits would wield the most power." Thus, in Tett's view
maximum profits were not the end in themselves but a means toward a higher end of "power"
- and one might add the related goal of status and prestige.
Even within the same business firm, she reports, "desks tended to hug information.
The right hand of the bank rarely knew what the left was doing in any detail - nor was the
risk management department any better informed." The very highest executives with crosscutting responsibilities for the entire business simply could not keep track of and coordinate
all this; in many cases they did not even understand, or even know about, what some of their
own individual divisions were doing. The financial regulatory apparatus of the government
was similarly fragmented and with similar results in terms of anyone being able to see the full
picture. As Tett comments, federal regulation of Wall Street was "marked by tribal rivalries
66
... that mirrored (and intensified) those private sector splits."
It seems that there was virtually no one willing to assume responsibility. for
understanding the cumulative workings of the U.S. housing finance system and its broader
consequences for Wall Street, the financial system and the overall U.S. economy. Tett writes
that "there were some journalists and some economists who could vaguely sense how the
overall patterns were playing out. But trying to get a clear vision of how finance was
developing as an entire system was hard. A sense of tunnel vision permeated the system
hampering bankers as much as anyone else."6 Tett does not really try to answer the obvious
question: why was no one strongly motivated at the time to examine this problem more
broadly and to act more effectively to do something about it. Any such inquiry might have
taken her into issues of the overall behavioral standards on Wall Street and the seeming
weakening of a sense of collective obligations - to the firm, to the finance industry, to the
nation -- among those who worked there. As one might say, it would have required an
exploration of the "religious capital" and its rapid "depreciation" from the 1980s onward. (A
similar critique might be made of the participants in the American university world which
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failed in one of its most important functions, providing in-depth and prescient analysis of new
key factors impacting on the housing finance system, and, thus, on the broader financial
system and then the economy and'the whole society.)
As a third key factor, Tett sees a particular problem in what she calls "social
silences," drawing on the work of the leading French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre
Bourdieu. This is a matter of addressing the question of priority setting within the intellectual
elite and "what is not discussed" in a given society. (At least until recently, any connection
between Wall Street and religion would have fallen in the "not discussed" category -- along
with most other roles of religion in the broader workings of the wider American political and
economic system.)
Tett observes that in most societies "there is simply a tacit, half
conscious recognition that it is better to simply avoid discussing an issue, or that there are
cultural disincentives to peering into it - because it is considered either taboo or 'boring."'
Indeed, except for those who profited directly from them, "back in 2005 and 2006 the topics
of credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations were considered to be incredibly
boring, if not downright arcane." " For many Americans businessmen, moreover, the basis
for ethical standards in business can be an uncomfortable subject - maybe better not
discussed -- because they can find it difficult to reconcile the actual world of business practice
that they know from personal experience with the high minded ethical principles that are
often preached to them by religious leaders on Sunday.
When Tett and a few other journalists did occasionally write about such matters
before 2007, she found that "it was often tough to get these stories on the front page," no
matter how fundamentally important they might actually be. This partly reflected the existing
lack of public interest which meant that few people would actually read the stories. And
adding another cultural factor, many top newspaper editors had become more attuned to the
commercial prospects of their publications than to a social obligation (akin to that of the
financial system) to serve the wider society. Thus, lacking journalistic intermediaries, and
"faced with financial goobledygook," Tett writes, "the general populace found it easier to
leave the whole field of finance in the hands of technical experts, particularly since those
technical experts were insisting before 2007 that modem finance [as practiced on Wall Street]
was a wonderfully beneficial thing" - a refrain much repeated up to 2007 not only by the
technical experts but also by high level Washington public figures such as Alan Greenspan,
Robert Rubin, and Larry Summers (not the political conservatives some people might expect
but all appointed - or in Greenspan's case reappointed - by the Clinton administration).6 It
was not only the experts specializing particularly in financial markets but the members of the
economics profession as a whole, as explored below, who fundamentally misread the
importance of the rapid changes occurring in the area of housing finance with large
70
implications for their own, much broader, economic concerns.
As one might summarize, across a number of important areas of American life, there
was a failure of high level "leadership." Much of this can simply be attributed to analytical
mistakes, or to other intellectual misjudgments arising among a large number of people.
Foolishness and recklessness sometimes played a part. But in the end, there seems to have
been a shortage of people who were personally motivated to penetrate the "goobledygook"
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described by Tett, who perceived an urgent need on their part to break out of their own
comfortable "silos," and who were individually willing to challenge the "social silences" by
which most societies avoid discussion of uncomfortable (and in some repressive societies,
literally dangerous) subjects.
There was thus a great shortage of rebels and saints in the United States who were
willing to take individual risks for the greater collective benefit. Every successful society
needs some such heroes who perform especially valuable functions for which they do not
receive any corresponding financial compensation -- or may even be punished. No combat
army could ever succeed without a share of such individuals willing to take some risks to get
around procedural rigidities and other obstacles to effective performance. The sources of
such catalytic leadership behavior in a society is a difficult subject, although religion is surely
an important part of the picture.
By 2007, a dawning awareness of all this was being expressed by a few members of
the American leadership class. Gerald Corrigan, the former president of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank, wrote to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that the banking industry
"needs a renewed commitment to collective discipline in the spirit of elevated financial
statesmanship that recognizes that there are circumstances in which individual institutions
must be prepared to put aside specific interests in the name of the common interest." But it
was hard to know how to revive a spirit of collective sacrifice in a Wall Street banking
community where, as Tett writes, "Corrigan lamented that there appeared to be few such
bankers left" who accepted any deep responsibilities to the wider American society."
Boston College professor of finance Edward Kane considered in 2012 that little had
improved even after experiencing the crisis of 2008 and 2009; top Wall Street managers "are
currently exploiting taxpayers to an end." They do not "see any ethical issues in it. The
taxpayer is the sucker in a poker game, and they see no reason to teach them anything about
playing cards" in seeking to combat Wall Street transgressions.72 Also in 2012 the libertarian
Charles Murray, normally a staunch defender of free markets, nevertheless observed that in
the events leading up to the financial crisis, there had been a major "deterioration of the sense
of stewardship that once was so widespread among the most successful Americans. ... Many
senior figures .in the financial world were appalled by what was going on during the run-up to
the financial meltdown of 2008." Murray observes, however, that most of them remained
"silent before and after the catastrophe." Murray concludes that there has been a breakdown
in the American business class of even the ability to articulate its own moral standards:
"Capitalists who behave honorably and with restraint no longer have either the platform or the
vocabulary to preach their own standards and to condemn capitalists who behave
dishonorably."7 3 It is a breakdown in the largest sense of religion in America, as exhibited in
this particular case on Wall Street.
If this assessment is correct, the academic world will be perplexed and dismayed
because it regards improvements in. religion as altogether outside its scope of either
knowledge or concern - there is no "science" to create a "better" religion. Within the
business schools, admittedly, there is an emerging growing recognition that the success of

71 Tett, supra note 62, at 229.
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American business depends on more than the nuts and bolts calculations of profits and losses.
Two prominent professors at Harvard Business School, Michael Porter and Jan Rivkin, in
2012 explained in Fortune magazine that every American business "draws on the business
environment in ... the communities where it operates," ranging from nearby local
communities to the national community as a whole. Others might use terms such as "civic
society" or "social capital," but Porter and Rivkin label the surrounding environment in which
businesses operate as the cultural "commons" -- thus bringing us back to the discussion of
how any society can deal with its free-rider problems characteristic of commons situations.74
Business has an obligation not only to make money, they say, but to support the
broader social and political foundations of American business success. As Porter and Rivkin
write, American business "can and should improve U.S. competitiveness ... by stopping selfinterested actions that weaken the commons."7 5 This will require the acceptance of new
obligations to contribute to the business commons and also of self-imposed restraints that
have all too often been lacking in business behavior in recent years. In the end, this pragmatic
course of action for American business will also require an ethical rethinking on a large scale.
As would most current academics, Porter and Rivkin have little to say, beyond the urgent
need, about how such an ethical - a "values" -- restoration in American business (and society,
more generally) might be accomplished. One option, however, is to begin by applying
methods of doing "economic theology" to explore such questions, as will be briefly illustrated
below.
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At least since the late nineteenth century, the religion of American business has not
been Methodism, Baptism, Catholicism, or any other traditional religious faith. Americans
were too divided in their traditional religious allegiances for any one faith to provide a
cultural foundation for the large business organizations that increasingly were dominating the
American economy. Under the influence of Darwin and many other social and intellectual
developments of the time, moreover, traditional Christian religion at the end of the nineteenth
century was seeing a large erosion of its authority in American life. Rather, the twentieth
century would become an age of growing authority for secular religions such as - however
appalling the results there would turn out to be - Communism in the former Soviet Union and
National Socialism in Germany. In the United States there was also a "civic religion" - a far
better one, fortunately -- that played a large part in the later successes of "the American
century." This common religion of America was also secular, centered on a conviction
common to all forms of "economic religion" -- that economic progress will save the world.
Americans saw themselves as in the vanguard of economic progress for the eventual greater
benefit of all human beings everywhere on earth. From President Woodrow Wilson onward,
they took upon themselves the mission to spread the message of economic progress (and
associated democratic practices) globally.
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As economic progress moved forward, the rapidly growing quantities of goods and
services to be produced in the United States would necessarily be produced by business. In
the civic religion of America, business thus had a central role. Working for a large American
corporation was a matter of earning a good living, but also to participate in a religious cause.
It would be the erosion of such religious convictions in the later decades of the twentieth
century, as this article suggests, that would eventually play a significant role in the leadership
crisis that led eventually to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. As the historic deep faith in
the civil religion of America waned, nothing religiously took its place in American society as
a unifying influence, either across the country as a whole, or in the financial system
specifically.
The Old FinancialSystem Faith
Andrew Carnegie, said in 1890 to be the richest man in the world, was not a
conventionally devout person himself, but did follow a creed that might be described as a
"secular Calvinism," inherited originally from his own Presbyterian roots in Calvinist
Scotland where he was born before emigrating as a child to the United States. The Calvinism
of old such as found in Presbyterianism had condemned the pursuit of luxury for its own sake,
but had taught that success in a calling - including prominently among such callings the
activities of the business world -- was a promising sign of being among the elect. Carnegie
adapted this message to a newly secular era, preaching that the successful businessman stood
in the good graces of a god of economic progress, helping by his actions to provide the basis
for the economic transformation of society. While sometimes necessarily ruthless in the
pursuit of business success and thus maximal economic efficiency, such businessmen should
renounce any excess consumption of the gains of their own efforts, instead giving their
wealth away in philanthropic efforts and other actions to benefit the wider community.
Carnegie himself acknowledged a religious side to his message when he preached the "gospel
of wealth." As he wrote:
It becomes the duty of the millionaire to increase his revenues. The
struggle for more is completely freed from selfish or ambitious taint and
becomes a noble pursuit. Then he labors not for self, but for others; not to
hoard but to spend. The more he makes, the more the public gets. His
whole life is changed from the moment that he resolves to become a
disciple of the gospel of wealth, and henceforth he labors to acquire that he
may wisely administer for others' good. His daily labor is a daily virtue.
This was not a mere pretense for Carnegie, a public relations gesture; he really
meant it. Unlike some people, moreover, Carnegie actually did as he preached, eventually
giving away almost the entirety of his vast fortune for a wide variety of public causes,
including the building of more than 2,000 community libraries across the United States, and
the construction of 7,000 church organs, as well as Carnegie Hall in New York City, thus
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touching the lives of millions of ordinary Americans. Carnegie, remarkably enough, spent
only about three hours a day on his business affairs, devoting the remainder of his time to
various intellectual and other public pursuits.
Carnegie is ranked with John D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan as pivotal business
figures in the economic transformation of the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. 7 9 As his biographer Jean Strouse explains, Morgan believed, much like
Carnegie, that government should "let financial experts [such as himself] alone to conduct
business in the nation's best interest." Indeed, Strouse agrees that, "Morgan had some
grounds for thinking that the country ought to leave its financial affairs to him." From 1860
to 1910, "his bank had helped transform the United States from an economic neophyte into
the strongest industrial power in the modern world." His success was built on his high
business skills and analytical intelligence combined with his high personal reputation for
trustworthiness. As Strouse comments, in those years "the risks involved in funding the
emerging U.S. economy were as enormous as the potential rewards, but investors regarded
the Morgan name on issues of stocks and bonds as a warranty" of reliable representation of
the risks and returns.80
This was, moreover, not a passive role: "Morgan personally took on the role of
financial disciplinarian, acting as mediator between the owners and the users of capital." He
had the authority to make sure that his financial customers were not subject to unscrupulous
practices when they put their money to work in the financial markets. According to Strouse,
"he was building internationally competitive financial and industrial structures, and his power
came not from his own wealth but from a record that led other bankers and industrialists to
trust him." Morgan personally organized the successful efforts of a number of leading
financiers of the time who banded together to halt the panic of 1907, not based as much on the
use of his own personal wealth (which would not have been sufficient), but the great
confidence and respect which his financial peers held him and thus were willing to follow his
leadership for the greater good of Wall Street and the country. As one might say, Morgan by
himself was able to solve the free-rider problem in order to avert a complete financial panic.
If not on the scale of Carnegie, Morgan also put his wealth to public use. He was
President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, spent $60 million in assembling
the finest private art collection of his time, acquired an equally distinguished library of rare
books and manuscripts, and then eventually donated much of this to public institutions. The
Morgan Library remains today in New York a cultural treasure visited by more than 100,000
people each year. In their later years, Carnegie and Morgan both spent almost half of each
year in Europe interacting with its leaders and absorbing its culture, leaving the details of
their business operations to trusted subordinates with whom they remained in close touch by
telephone and telegraph. It is difficult to imagine any leading American business today
functioning in a similar fashion.
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The Progressive-Era"Gospel ofEfficiency"
The progressive era, typically dated from 1890 to 1920, saw the rise of new sources
of authority in American society that would challenge and eventually greatly surpass that of
the Camegies and Morgans. The responsibility for controlling American financial panics
would soon pass from Morgan and his Wall Street peers to the Federal Reserve Bank, created
in 1913. The central role in leading America on the path of economic progress would more
and more be assumed by government experts, many of them the graduates of the American
university system which was retooled in the progressive era along its current professional and
disciplinary lines. Here again, a secular form of religion -- a "gospel of efficiency" -- played
an important part in the new "progressive" design for what would grow steadily over the
course of the twentieth century to become the contemporary American welfare and regulatory
state (often misleadingly described as "capitalism").
In Europe and North America, the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century saw an astonishing surge of material productivity. Applications were found for the
laws of electro-magnetism and other newly acquired scientific knowledge, giving mankind
comprehensive technological powers to control the workings of nature for human benefit.
Standards of living rose greatly and many leading intellectuals came to believe that dire
poverty, and perhaps even all material scarcity, could fairly soon be ended, thus eliminating
the longstanding basis for the many past ills of society. Among the earliest of such
progressive utopians was Karl Marx for whom the defining feature of progress was the
historical struggle between the haves and the have-nots by which the latter are destined to
perennially challenge and eventually overcome their exploitation by the former. An ideal
state-a communist state-would finally become possible, however, once the unpropertied
proletariat had completely prevailed and established its own rule by means of a worldwide
revolution. Making it all possible would be the looming end of scarcity - Marx even saw
capitalism in a favorable light as a necessary, but only temporary, part of this final economic
advance. A "new man" would be the product of abolishing the intense economic conflicts -the class struggles -- that inevitably had arisen in a world of dire material shortage.
Marxism's apocalyptic route of secular salvation makes it distinctive, but some of
its core tenets, including the notion that a new world of complete material abundance will
eliminate the presence of sin in the world, were widely shared in the late nineteenth and well
into the twentieth century - and underlay the early development of economics as a social
science in the United States. Influential in this regard was the Protestant Social Gospel
movement, which celebrated the recent great advances in economic productivity, while
condemning the self-interested mentality and social inequality advanced by capitalist
economics. In focusing. on worldly economic outcomes, social gospelers shifted their
religious hopes from the attainment of a heaven in the hereafter to the future achievement of a
new heaven on earth.
In Ministers of Reform: The Progressives'Achievement in American Civilization,
the historian Robert Crunden writes that in the progressive era, despite the rapid spread of
secular patterns of thought, "America remained dominated by patterns of religious thought,"
if now taking new forms. Some of these remained explicitly religious, "giving rise to what
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became the social gospel movement. Most were implicit, shaping ideas that seemed to be
about secular matters." If now in a disguised way, it was nevertheless still the case that
"religion provided the central motivating force ... but the subsequent secularization of
modern culture has obscured the importance of religion in forming the minds of even the most
secular thinkers." 8 2 The progressives did not simply apply their zeal for progress in
government matters, but sought to extend its guiding principles of scientific management to
the workings of the whole society, including its core business functions.
Following the great disappointments arising out of the death and devastation of
World War I, however, the progressive era, as conventionally dated, came to an end in 1920.
Professional economics itself increasingly asserted a value-neutral and strictly scientific
status. The word economic "growth" supplanted the more value laden term, "progress."
Some leading economists, however, continued to preach fundamental progressive ideals.
John Maynard Keynes, for one, was especially articulate in describing the link between future
material and future moral progress. In his eloquent 1930 essay "Economic Possibilities for
our Grandchildren," Keynes predicted that in "days not so very remote" we will enjoy "the
greatest change which has ever occurred in the material environment of life for human beings
in the aggregate." This "destination of economic bliss" will completely transform society:
"the nature of one's duty to one's neighbor" will change, and we will finally be "able to rid
ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us" and blighted so
many lives since time immemorial.
Even as fewer and fewer economists were as explicit about all this as Keynes, the
progressive religion and its optimistic economic determinism about the future remained
central for at least several more decades in shaping the thinking of both twentieth-century
economists and businessmen. As recently as 2009, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd
Blankfein, famously told a reporter that he and other bankers at his firm were "doing God's
work.",8 Although Blankfein was widely derided for saying this, and later said he was just
joking, there was an important element of truth - in the objective he stated at least, if not the
actual presence of much "God-like" behavior on Wall Street. For many people in the
twentieth century, the pursuit of economic progress offered a path to a new heaven on earth,
motivating them to lend their services to a great religious cause -- including many people on
Wall Street.
The Waning ofProgressiveFaith
After a lifetime of working for the advance of the American economic system and,
in later years, devoting heroic efforts to advocating the cause of world peace, Andrew
Carnegie was confronted by the horrors of World War I with its shattering repudiation of his
fundamental beliefs. His wife Louise would later write that Carnegie had been "the most
vital, exuberant person imaginable - until August 4, 1914. Then he completely changed. The
war practically destroyed him" and his health until he died in 1919.84 His biographer, David
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Nassaw, writes that "for the past two decades, he had expended every bit of energy and made
himself a slightly ridiculous figure in Washington, London, and Berlin, in his futile attempt to
forestall the horrors of war. He realized now that he had failed. His faith, that reason and
good sense would ultimately prevail," based on a century of previous immense economic
progress, that "the nations and peoples of the world were becoming more civilized and less
barbarous, had been spectacularly misplaced."8 5 Alan Greenspan would face a similar
moment of truth in October 2008.
It was not only Carnegie. Indeed, the dark shadows of the twentieth century-two
world wars, the prospect of nuclear annihilation, ecological degradation-suggested the
possibility that human beings conceivably could even extinguish their presence on earth.
Indeed, one of the most influential belief systems of the last few decades has suggested the
opposite: that we might be rushing toward hell on earth. This idea, that economic progress is
destroying significant parts of the plant and animal kingdoms and could even threaten human
existence, is at the heart of a more recent secular religion, environmentalism."
Over a wide range of policy debates-from the fight over DDT to the crusade
against nuclear power, from the alarms about the "population bomb," to the grim tidings
about climate change-environmentalism has proclaimed that much of the scientific
knowledge on which we have founded our project of economic growth is not an unqualified
good." Indeed, the progressive goal of the human mastery of both nature and society might
be a dangerous delusion. Many environmentalists hold special scorn for the economists who
have so confidently promoted economic growth as our highest goal; one environmental
philosopher, Georgia Tech professor, Bryan Norton, even penned an article in 1991 on the
good reasons "why environmentalists hate mainstream economists." 88
Environmentalism might be described as a new "secular fundamentalism" that is
partly derived from earlier roots in Calvinist fundamentalism -- both, for example, preach
abstinence from excessive consumption." Other forms of more traditionally religious
fundamentalism were also making a comeback in the last decades of the twentieth century.
By the mid twentieth century, the progressive ideals of the social gospel movement had
thoroughly penetrated the thinking of mainline Protestant denominations such as Lutherans,
Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Methodists. Saving the world in the here and now had
replaced for them the old sin and salvation. Another sign of the waning of progressive faith,
however, was that it was precisely these mainline Protestant religions that lost much of their
membership between 1960 and 2000, while the more evangelical and fundamentalist forms of
American Protestantism experienced rapid growth. Similar developments occurred in other
places around the world as Islamic, Hindu and other old religious fundamentalisms gained
strength at the expense of secular socialist true beliefs. All of these fundamentalisms had in
common that they represented a turn away from the formerly dominant religions of economic
progress.
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IV. WALL STREET'S CHANGING RELIGION

'

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the participants in the financial system
experienced the same growing doubts about the religion of economic progress as seen in such
developments in other American arenas. On Wall Street, however, the various Protestant,
environmental, and other new fundamentalisms, did not attract many new followers. With the
fading of economic religion (and mainline Protestantism as well), Wall Street, as one might
say, experienced a new religious rootlessness. This was a major problem because a widely
shared religion was important for asserting a unifying influence and upholding ethical
standards within the "community" of Wall Street.
The waning of the collective progressive spirit probably commenced in the 1960s in
the United States - the beginning decade of many great transformations in American life -and in the financial system but a major shift in the culture of Wall Street was becoming more
evident by the 1980s. Among other reporters, the events there were chronicled in 1993 in
Nightmare on Wall Street: Salomon Brothers and the Corruption of the Marketplace,
authored by Martin Mayer, among the most knowledgeable journalist observers of American
As he assessed matters, the "corruption" of Wall
financial institutions of recent decades,
Street in the 1980s was a symptom of a wider American problem: "In the 1980s too much of
America lost the fear of shame that used to police behavior; in the 1980s it became
fashionable to respect people for putting up with shame - provided they were paid well to do
so" - as many were on Wall Street.9
As part of the wider investment-banking trend that would work to undermine
traditional Wall Street accountability, Salomon Brothers went public in 1981. Another key
change affecting the subsequent ethical problems was the increasing complexity of the
financial instruments in which Salomon and other Wall Street firms traded and in which
Salomon had been a leading innovator, including in the sale of mortgage-backed securities.
As Mayer writes, "many, although no means all, of the swaps, segmentations, caps, and
straddles that transformed corporate finance in the 1980s were invented at Salomon Brothers
by very bright and competent men (and a few women)." Among a long list of new financial
instruments developed at Salomon were "zero-coupon insured term deposits for banks to sell
consumers, and tax-exempt financing in London for Boeing to lease airplanes to American
Airlines; "COLTS" (Continuously Offered Longer-Term Securities") for the World Bank and
"CARS" ("Collateralized Automobile Receivables") to package car loans into bonds for sale
both in the United States and Europe" (the automobile equivalent of a mortgage backed
security). Salomon had had exceptional research capabilities for an investment bank since the
early 1960s and, as Mayer reports, this "move to complicated, hybrid, derivative instruments
was in hindsight a natural progression" - paving the way for still more complex derivatives
9
and other financial instruments coming out of Wall Street in the 1990s and 2000s.
The historical ethic of Wall Street was based on trust; as Mayer reports, traditionally
"Salomon worked almost entirely on a basis of trust." Written contracts were not necessary
because "people lived up to what they said on the trading floor or on the telephone or at
lunch." But trust was eroding in financial markets as the unifying influence of a common

9 Martin Mayer, Nightmare on Wall Street: Salomon Brothers and the Corruption of the Marketplace, at 256
(Equinox Publishing 2014).
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culture eroded. Maintaining trust was also becoming increasingly difficult as the complexity
of financial instruments grew - trust is more difficult if the parties cannot be sure that they
share the same understandings. As Mayer puts it, "it's hard to expose incorrect valuation of
an interest-rate swap when there are four ways to 'mark' such swaps to market, and they give
four different results." Another problem was, as a Federal Reserve official noted in 1992,
although "off-balance sheet activities ... must be understood by top management as well as
by traders and rocket sciences," they often did not have such an understanding.
Across Wall Street, as Mayer reports, "it turned out that the youngsters who
succeeded to the Salomon name had never learned why there were rules against cheating."
The ethical dangers were greatest in the areas of the new financial instruments because their
technical complexity meant that the quants were often operating almost without adult
supervision.9 The ethical problem was growing more widespread at Salomon and on Wall
Street as the 1980s advanced.9 3 Surveying the wreckage at Solomon in 1993, Mayer finds
that during the decade of the 1980s "the definitions of what constituted ethical behavior
would change for the worse throughout the financial markets."94
Paul Volker, Henry Kaufman, and others had emphasized that, given its great
impact on American society and the difficulties of maintaining outside regulatory oversight, it
was essential that Wall Street have an internal sense of social responsibility going beyond the
mere making of money. That sense of wider responsibility seemingly almost disappeared
over the course of the 1980s at Salomon and many other firms. As Mayer found, "very few
of those involved in this industry in the 1980s - not the money managers in the institutions,
not the leaders of the securities houses, not the CFOs of the corporations - contributed to their
economy or to their society anything like what they were paid."95
By 1988, Kaufman, hired by Salomon in 1961, and an icon on Wall Street during
the 1970s and early 1980s for his widely distributed and reported analyses of financial
matters, had enough. He quit the firm -- and it proved to be good timing. A top Salomon
employee in the spring of 1991 had brazenly violated Treasury Department rules for trading
in government securities. The Salomon culture had spun out of control to the extent that it
had gone beyond the mere poor treatment of customers - as Mayer writes, there was a steady
incoming flow of "new, ignorant players to be fleeced almost every day" -- to outright illegal
acts. Ethical standards may have plummeted in the 1980s, but outright illegality crossed a
different line. Salomon was soon under investigation by the Treasury Department, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the House Banking Committee and other public and
private authorities. John Gutfreund, the head of the firm since Billy Salomon had retired in
1978, and other top managers were forced out. Mayer reports that the new Salomon
management team "was squaring their shoulders manfully in preparation for paying out about
half a billion dollars in fines and settlements of private lawsuits to seal the record of what the
previous management did and failed to do in 1989-1991."96

9 Richard M. Bookstaber, A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial
Innovation (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007).
9 Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker, Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street (Norton 1989).
9 Mayer, supranote 90, at 99.
9 Id. at 253-254.
9 Id. at 248, 250.
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How can we explain what happened at Salomon and throughout much of Wall Street
in the 1980s and 1990s -- a precursor to the greater breakdowns of the 2000s? There were, as
noted above, a number of factors, but the root of the problem was ethical, cultural and
religious. In the new religious and other diversity of Wall Street, there was a large "religious
failure." To the extent that any religious agreement existed on Wall Street, the new
common"libertarian" religion emphasized full freedom of all religion. Such a religion,
however, was too weak to hold the full community of the financial system together.
Wall Streeters had not long ago, in short, been strong believers in the "civil religion"
of American, at the heart of which lay the redemptive promise of economic progress. But the
generation of Americans that was born after World War II was increasingly skeptical of such
traditional American religion - for them, for example, the implications of the "economic
efficiency" of the holocaust could not simply be dismissed as a challenge to the very essence
of economic religion. This was the growing religious problem confronting the financial
system from the 1960s onwards, accelerating in the 1980s and 1990s, and coming to a climax
in 2008 and 2009.
V. A BANKRUPT PRIESTHOOD
It helps to maintain a religion if its priesthood is widely respected and has the full
confidence of the members of society. It was thus an important contributing factor to the
eroding faith in the American civic religion that the priesthood of economic progress, the
professional economists of the nation and the world, was facing its own growing crisis of
confidence around the same time that religious common agreement in the financial system
was eroding.
As a special issue commemorating its first 100 years of existence, The Economic
Journal(the journal of the Royal Economic Society of England, one of the most prestigious
in the world of economics) published in 1991 a series of 22 articles on "The Next 100 Years."
The articles also provided an occasion for introspective reflection on the record of the
economics profession over the previous 100 years. A few of the articles were optimistic
about existing economic methods, but the majority suggested that economics had become too
narrow and that a major widening of professional horizons and methods and a firmer
empirical grounding for the discipline was much to be desired. Dartmouth economist,
Andrew Oswald, set the tone in his contribution, describing a sense of malaise that he
perceived in 1991 concerning the directions of the profession:
Is Economics going in the right direction? Some people think not. [Former
Harvard economist and Nobel economics prize winner] Wassily Leontief
has argued that our discipline has deteriorated into a second-rate branch of
applied mathematics in which, unscientifically, researchers eschew
empirical investigations. [University of Chicago economist] James
Heckman says that the subject is "widely perceived to be discredited
because it has so little empirical content and cares so little about
developing it." [Stanford economist] John Pencavel concludes that
economists do not want applied work to be done, because it is likely to
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reveal the irrelevance of their hypotheses and undermine their ability to
derive sweeping implications from theoretical models.97
As described by Oswald, it was almost as if professional economics was a
throwback to the medieval priesthoods that maintained scholastic orthodoxies by asserting
rigorous controls over church writings and admission to the ranks. Mathematics was the new
Latin to separate the priesthood from the laity. Frank Hahn, a leading British economist who
himself gained fame as a general equilibrium theorist, did not necessarily agree with the view
of others that in every case "pure theory is scholastic and so by implication bound to be
irrelevant to the world." But the method of pure economic theory admittedly does involve
"the activity of deducing implications from a small number of fundamental axioms," often
leading for the economist to a powerful sense of artistic "beauty" and intellectual "surprise."98
Another leading economist, William Baumol, found similarly that a "peril" facing economics
is that "few specialized students are allowed to proceed without devoting a very considerable
portion of their time to the acquisition of mathematical tools, and they often come away
feeling that any piece of writing they produce will automatically be rejected as unworthy if it
is not liberally sprinkled with an array of algebraic symbols."" As in the scholasticism of
old, demonstrations of great logical skill and elegance were taking precedence. It was another
way in which economics was closer to a religion than a science.
As one of the leading economists of the twentieth century, Milton Friedman's views
as expressed in 1991 in the Economic Journal are of particular interest.'1 Friedman is
generally supportive of the turn during the twentieth century of the economics profession
towards greater use of mathematical and statistical methods. However, much like Baumol, he
finds that things have gone too far. Indeed, Friedman declares in 1991 that the "reliance on
mathematics and econometrics" has reached "the point of vanishing returns" (25 years later, it
should be noted, little change was apparent in 2017). The use of mathematics is no longer
making a contribution to economic understanding, but has become an end in itself. As
Friedman comments, "again and again, I have read articles written primarily in mathematics,
in which the central conclusions and reasoning could readily have been restated in
English."'o1
Friedman finds that, as recently as 1930, under the editorship of John Maynard
Keynes, the entire Volume 40 of The Economic Journal contained one page that included
mathematical symbols. But mathematics after World War II became the language by which
economists in the twentieth century sought to assert their priestly prerogatives.
Unfortunately, as Friedman concludes, this has not led to corresponding increases in
economic understanding. "[T]o summarize," he writes, "there has been little change in the
major issues occupying the attention of economists: they are very much the same as those that
Adam Smith dealt with more than two centuries ago. Moreover, there has not been a major
sea change in our understanding of these issues." In physics and chemistry, the writings of
200 years ago are a mere historical curiosity. But it is still possible to "read the Wealth of

Andrew Oswald, Progressand MicroconomicData, 101 Econ. J. 404 (January 1991).
Frank Hahn, The Next Hundred Years, 101 Econ. J. 404, 47 (January 1991).
9 William J. Baumol, Toward a Newer Economics: The Future Lies Ahead! 101 Econ. J. 404, 2, 6 (January
1991).
'a Milton Friedman, Old Wine in New Bottles, 101 Econ. J. 404, 36 (January 1991).
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Nations and David Hume's essays Of Money and Of Interest with pleasure and intellectual
profit." In re-examining old volumes of The Economic Journal, Friedman is struck by how
"the substance of professional economic discussion has remained remarkably unchanged over
the past century" since the first volume of the journal was published. If the substance was not
much different, to be sure, "the language" has changed "drastically."1 02 Displays of virtuosity
in the new language of mathematics have become more important for many economists than
the development of real economic insight..
Friedman also is pessimistic in seeing little gain in the quality of economic
understanding from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries: it is poor in both periods. He
quotes a statement of economist W.J. Ashley in 1907, that "when one looks back on a century
of economic teaching and writing, the chief lesson should, I feel, be one of caution and
modesty, and especially when we approach the burning issues of our own day. We
economists . . . have been so often in the wrong!" Friedman declares that this conclusion
from 1907 "can serve as mine in 1990."103 The great commitment to formal quantitative rigor
in economic methods of the twentieth century, as Friedman concludes, has done little to
improve economic judgments. Although few economists listened, his arguments would look
prescient by 2008 and 2009.
A leading French economist of the second half of the twentieth century, Edmund
Malinvaud, offered yet another pessimistic view. In assessing developments in economics
since World War II, Malinvaud declares that these years "were obviously marked first by a
wave of optimism, then by the painful realization that most of the initial beliefs were the
product of delusion. This applies whether one considers the broad development issues [in
poorer countries] or the more modest current problems of industrial countries." In the 1950s,
large numbers of economists believed that their work would soon "lead to international
economic order; it will gear development in the Third World; it will show the way to good
socio-economic performance in alternative systems to capitalism." As the events of the
second half of the twentieth century unfolded, however, these optimistic beliefs had not been
realized. "[T]he beliefs appear to have been mainly unwarranted, following from wishful
1
thinking and from bold or loose extrapolations of what economics really knew." 0
In the later decades of the twentieth century, economic professionals had shifted
their optimism away from direct government control of production towards the management
of the market system. Yet, here again, as Malinvaud found, this more recent neo-liberal trend
in economics had yielded "the same sequence of confidence and disappointment [that then]
occurred with respect to the role of economic management in market economies, whether it
concerned allocation of resources, distribution of welfare or macroeconomic stabilisation."
Part of the problem had been the failure of economists to understand that "public management
is never a purely economic matter and cannot be immune from political interference, if only
because the notion of an objective to be achieved can seldom be precisely defined
beforehand." Another problem is that "side effects that had been taken as negligible turned
out to be determinant" such as popular resistance among the many competitive losers in the
dynamic workings of a market process. On the whole, Malinvaud argued in 1991, among
professional economists there had been a demonstrated "inability to solve the real problems"
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that had acted to undermine the earlier high hopes for the economics profession to spread
economic progress across the whole world, redemptive hopes that had originally taken shape
in the United States in the progressive era. 105
Economics and the FinancialCrisis
Friedman's and Malinvaud's concerns in 1991 would prove to be prophetic in light
of the financial crisis of recent times. Indeed, for the economics profession, the financial
events of 2008 and 2009 and the "Great Recession" that continued to depress growth for
many years to follow would prove to be humbling experiences. They offered powerful
evidence to back up the many criticisms of the professional economic priesthood (mostly
from outside the profession but also including a minority cadre of economist critics within the
profession) that had been growing over the previous decades.
Robert Samuelson, a prominent economic columnist for the Washington Post, thus
wrote of "an intellectual breakdown. There is a loss of faith in economic ideas - and
government policies based on them - driven by most economists' failure to anticipate the
financial crisis and many subsequent events."' 0 6 Indeed, the lack of confidence in
economists' ability to manage the economy might have become a causal factor in itself,
diminishing overall public confidence in the economic future and thus potentially altering
ongoing consumption and investment decisions. The events from 2008 to 2016 have been
particularly embarrassing because in the period from 1990 to 2008, a number of prominent
economists advertised a newfound professional economic ability to guide the American
economy on a stable path. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association
in 2003, the University of Chicago macroeconomist Robert Lucas (winner of the Nobel prize
in economics in 1995) declared that "macroeconomics ... has succeeded. Its central problem
of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been
solved for many decades.""o 7
In a similar vein in 2004, the Princeton economist Ben Bernanke, then a member of
the Federal Reserve Board who in 2006 became Chairman of the Board, observed in a speech
to the Eastern Economic Association that "one of the most striking features of the economic
landscape over the past twenty years or so has been a substantial decline in macroeconomic
volatility," a development labeled by Bernanke and other economists as "The Great
Moderation," also taking for granted that it would continue.1os In seeking to understand the
greater macroeconomic stability of the previous 20 years, Bernanke attributed it in part to
"structural change," among which he ironically included as an important helpful development
"the increased depth and sophistication of financial markets." Another second key factor for
Bernanke was "improved performance of macroeconomic policies" on the part of the
American government. As Bernanke explained, "few disagree that monetary policy has
played a large part in stabilizing inflation, and so the fact that output volatility has declined in
os
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parallel with inflation volatility, both in the United States and abroad, suggests that monetary
policy may have helped moderate the variability of [national economic] output as well." 09 He
would of course turn out to be spectacularly wrong.
The Economic PriesthoodConfesses
After the initial shock of the financial crisis, professional economists began to try to
come to terms with its implications. The MIT economist, and then Director of Economic
Research at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Olivier Blanchard, convened a 2011 IMF
conference with the 23 papers published in 2012 as, In the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
10
There was general agreement that the
Leading Economists Reassess Economic Policy.o
dominant macroeconomic understandings of the economics profession as of 2006 had
essentially collapsed. University of California at Berkeley macroeconomist David Romer
wrote of the mainstream of macroeconomics that:
The financial and macroeconomic crisis that began in 2008 has shattered
some of the core beliefs of macroeconomists and macroeconomic policy
makers:
-- We thought we had macroeconomic fluctuations well under control, but
they are back with a vengeance.
-- We thought that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates was a
minor issue, but it has proved central to the behavior of the
macroeconomy.
-- We had not paid much attention to issues of financial regulation and
financial disruptions, but they too have turned out to be critical to
macroeconomic performance.
-- The idea that policymakers would tolerate years of exceptionally high
unemployment due to a deficiency of aggregate demand has gone from
unthinkable five years ago to fact today.
-- The workhorse Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models on which we were concentrating so much of our attention
have been of minimal value in addressing the greatest macroeconomic
crisis in three-quarters of a century."'
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A leading American economics journal, The Journal of Economic Literature, in
2012 reviewed the poor performance of the economics profession and other economic writers
in the lead-up to the financial crisis and then in offering a cure. MIT Sloan School economist
Andrew Lo reviewed 21 prominent books since 2008, about half by professional economists
and the other half by leading financial and economic journalists, all of them developing
interpretations of the causes of the financial crisis. 1 12 The economics profession, as the article
acknowledged, now had to come to terms with its large recent mistakes. A key factor in the
financial crisis was the collapse of the housing bubble and, as Lo wrote, it had to be admitted
that "despite their eight-hundred-year history, bubbles are still rather mysterious economic
phenomena" for the members 'of the economics profession. Indeed, reflecting the traditional
reluctance of economists to confront the existence of such "irrational" economic phenomena,
not only have economists been reluctant to study bubbles, but surprisingly many have even
expressed skepticism that bubbles really exist at all. Economists have long portrayed the
workings of competitive markets as efficient generators and consumers of information, but in
the events leading up to the financial crisis, as Lo commented, it was undeniable that "the
13
information-gathering function of the price mechanism was clearly awry."'
One analyst commented that the financial crisis had shown how "markets can
remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent." Contrary to the portrayals
in economic models, the search for profits on Wall Street was not always a matter of careful
calculation and deliberation; rather, as Lo reported, some leading firms such as Bear Stearns
had exhibited a "dysfunctional management and aggressive corporate culture - even by the
standards of Wall Street." 1 l 4 Yet, professional economic writings about the workings of
markets in the United States seldom had said much about the importance of corporate culture
to the wider economic system. For one thing, saying anything about a matter as "soft" as
culture would have required economists to move outside their familiar territory of "hard"
analysis of "rational" economic events involving fully informed decision makers in the
market. The might have had to face the fact that human psychology had a large impact on
major economic outcomes, an area of study traditionally considered outside the boundaries of
economic responsibility or expertise. Addressing such matters would have required
economists to transcend their own rationalist "economic religion"; their inability to do this
was another part of the "religious crisis" contributing to the financial crisis.
As Lo sums up his 2012 review of 21 leading books offering explanations of the
financial crisis, "there is still significant disagreement [including among professional
economists] as to what the underlying causes of the crisis were, and even less agreement as to
what to do about it." Perhaps even "more disconcerting for most economists ;... we can't
even agree on all the facts. Did [Wall Street] CEOs take too much risk, or were they acting as
they were incentivized to act?" Lo was concerned that the damage to the prestige and
reputation of the members of the economics profession might prove to be lasting. Indeed, Lo
suggested that economists might now be "more likely to be thought of as [modern- day]
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astrologers, making pronouncements and predictions without any basis in fact or empirical
evidence."' 15 If true, it would add another religious dimension to the financial crisis.
An Economist's View from March 2017
The British economist, Adair Turner, is among the best informed and most
thoughtful about the financial system. In September 2008, just as the financial crisis was
breaking, he became the chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority. Together with
Mervyn King, the head of the Bank of England, and Alistair Darling, the UK finance minister,
the three were at the center of devising and orchestrating the UK emergency response. As
Turner would later report, walking into his new job, "I had no idea we were on the verge of
disaster. Nor did almost everyone in the central banks, regulators, or finance ministries, nor
16
in financial markets or major economics departments."
So much for the assumptions of perfect knowledge and perfect rationality that long
informed the dominant neo-classical economics of the twentieth century. As the 1978 winner
of the Nobel prize in economics, Herbert Simon, would write in 1987 of neo-classical
economics, "most of its 'action' ... derives from the usually untested, auxiliary assumptions
that describe the environment in which decisions are made," yielding an economic
methodology that is essentially "tautological and irrefutable."' 1 17 As Simon had already said
in 1986, the contemporary leading practice of economics thus amounted to a "scholastic
exercise."118 That is to say, neo-classical economics more closely resembled religion than
science.
In 2012, Turner looked back on the events of the financial crisis and the following
years to draw some conclusions for contemporary economics. He argued that it was first
necessary "not only to reject the simplifications of the dominant [professional] wisdom as a
perversion of good economics, but also to reconstruct the way in which economics is taught
and practiced." This would include that "economics should recognize the importance of
political, philosophical and ethical issues, to which mathematics is incapable of giving precise
answers." Economists must therefore "accept Keynes' dictum that 'economics is a moral
science' -- that 'no part of man's nature or his institutions must be entirely outside [the
economist's] regard, and the economist should be 'mathematician, historian, statesman and
philosopher in some degree" -- and I might now add theologian.11
In March 2017, Turner looked back at the response to the financial crisis in the years
since 2008. It had been devised by an economic elite that still regarded economics as an
essentially technical subject. Turner issued a harsh judgment on the demonstrated results. As
he wrote, in seeking to escape from the consequences of the financial crisis, there had been a
"profound failure of mainstream economic theory and orthodox economic policy."12 0 As
Turner thinks, this failure can be seen as a main cause of the 2016 great shocks to policy
Id. at 173.
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making elites, as seen in the Brexit vote in Britain and the American election of Donald
Trump.
Whatever the fitness of Donald Trump to be President, as Turner thinks, the
American elite was in fact guilty as judged in November 2016 by the voters. The dominant
monetary policy emphasis on "quantitative easing" had served to create financial bubbles in
the stock and bond markets that enriched the holders of such financial assets -- the already
well off members of American society -- while doing little to stimulate rapid growth of the
overall economy where ordinary Americans lived. As Turner explains for the similar case of
England:
Increasingly too, it has become clear that the austerity plus ultra-loose
monetary policy drives increasing inequality. In a June 2016 speech, Andy
Haldane, chief economist of the Bank of England, asked the simple
question "Whose recovery?" His answer for the UK is that while wealth
has increased 40% since 2007, income per capita has hardly increased at
all. That was the inevitable consequence of relying on asset price inflation
rather than direct fiscal stimulus to maintain economic growth. This
unequal policy impact, moreover, has come on top of more fundamental
long-term factors driving increased inequality in developed economies. ...
For some 30 years, a combination of information and communications
technology and the globalization of trade, capital and labor flows, have
tended to produce huge gains for a small number of high skilled and lucky
people but stagnant real wages for the less fortunate. But legitimate
concerns about these effects were too easily dismissed by the policy
establishment as "luddite," ill informed, or, in the concerns about
immigration, as closet racism.121
It would take virtually a revolution in professional economics to rethink the
longstanding mainstream orthodoxies, a religious revolution that is nowhere in sight. The
greatest obstacle to a rethinking of economics thus is not technical; rather, it is that economic
and other policy elites cling to their existing ideas as matters of religious faith and certainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The financial crisis on Wall Street of 2008 and 2009 was preceded by an ethical
breakdown. Normal social restraints and a sense of a greater public responsibility were all
too often missing. A main contributing factor was the erosion among the members of the
financial system (paralleling developments in American life in general) since the 1960s -- and
accelerating in the next decades -- of the traditional civil religion that promised the salvation
of the world through economic progress, democracy, and other main features of "the
American way." Various religious alternatives emerged, such as American environmentalism,
but on Wall Street they did not achieve wide enough acceptance to substitute for the historic
unifying role of the traditional civil religion of the United States. The financial system, like
the country as a whole, thus faced a new pluralism of fundamental ethical and religious

"2 Id. at 255.
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convictions. In the absence of a unifying common bond of shared belief to fend off its free
rider problems, the financial system experienced a massive failure of the commons in the
2000s.
The financial crisis in this respect can therefore be said to have been in significant
part a religious crisis. In looking towards the future, however, this diagnosis does not offer a
solution. It is unlikely that any of the economic religions of progress of the twentieth century
will experience a great renewal. Indeed, it appeared increasingly doubtful over the course of
the century that economic progress could be expected to lead to corresponding moral
progress. Another critical problem is the loss of public confidence in the legitimate expertise
of the professional economic priesthood -- as exacerbated by the events of the financial crisis.
Finding the way forward will be more difficult because of the absence of recent skills and
experience among the American professional and other elites in discussing in public the larger
religious questions of politics and economics . One prediction can be made with confidence:
religion in all its traditional and more recent secular religious dimensions will have a central
role in shaping the political and economic history of the twenty-first century.

86

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol17/iss1/5

42

